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COMMENTS
PEOPLE V. RYAN': A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
INTRODUCTION
Consider two scenarios. In the first, a woman is waiting
for a federal express package. Her sometime boyfriend, a drug
dealer, has told her that the package contains a small amount
of heroin. The woman, who has little knowledge of her
boyfriend's business, reluctantly agrees to keep the package for
him. When the woman accepts delivery of the package, she is
arrested by undercover police. The package actually contains
over a kilogram of heroin. In the second scenario, a different
woman is awaiting a federal express package from a friend.
Her friend has told the truth: the package contains a kilogram
of heroin, which he will later distribute on the street. The
woman readily agrees to this, as she has to similar transac-
tions in the past. When she is later arrested with the package,
she is fully aware of the quantity of heroin.2
The protagonists of these two scenarios have each commit-
ted the same act. The harm caused to society is the same in
each case. Moreover, both women are culpable: each knowingly
consented to engage in the criminal act of possessing heroin.
1 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993).
2 These scenarios are a composite of fact patterns taken from cases discussed
in this comment, relating to the Ryan decision and federal enhanced-penalty provi-
sions. See infra notes 88-125 and accompanying text. A mens rea requirement for
quantity offers particular protection from unjust punishment for women; women of
limited knowledge and culpability often become peripherally involved in narcotic$
crime through coercion and threats of violence. See New Yorh State Defendem
Association, &uc., Memorandum Concerning S.6912, June 7, 1994.
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But these situations are not identical. The woman in the first
scenario mistakenly believed she possessed only a small quan-
tity of heroin. The woman in the second scenario knew exactly
how much heroin she possessed.
The question raised by these two scenarios is whether the
punishment imposed on each of these women should reflect the
difference in their knowledge. Depending on the answer, there
could be a dramatic difference in their respective fates. In most
jurisdictions, quantity plays a pivotal role in determining se-
verity of sentence. Under certain federal statutes, differences
in quantity can double the mandatory minimum sentences.'
Under New York law, quantity can determine whether a per-
son spends a lifetime in prison or only a year.'
Federal courts currently apply enhanced penalties linked
to aggravating factors such as quantity without regard to a
defendant's knowledge of this factor. A defendant will be sen-
tenced according to the actual quantity possessed, even though
because of accident, mistake or treachery, she believed that
she possessed a much smaller amount.' This legal determina-
tion implicitly contains an ethical assessment and a policy
decision about a defendant's guilt: the personal culpability
evinced by a knowing participation in any narcotics offense is
by itself so great that further culpability distinctions based on
aggravating factors are unwarranted. Thus, if the two women
were both prosecuted in federal court, their respective levels of
knowledge would not be factors in sentencing. In the eyes of
the law, they would be equally guilty.6
In People v. Ryan,7 New York's highest court reached a
holding diametrically opposed to federal law. Under Ryan,
whenever quantity is an element of a narcotics crime, prosecu-
tors must establish a "knowing" mens rea with regard to that
quantity.8 This holding surprised and alarmed commentators,
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney 1989).
United States v. de Velasquez, 28 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
679 (1994).
' See id. and infra note 87 and accompanying text.
82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993).
8 Id. at 501, 626 N.E.2d at 54, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "mens rea" as "a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
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legislators and, most particularly, prosecutors.9 Yet the court
reached its holding through a straightforward application of
statutory construction rules.'0 The mens rea requirement for
quantity, the court held, had been in the statute all along-in
keeping with the goals of "fairness and proportionality" un-
derlying New York's Penal Code."
Nevertheless, the New York State Legislature quickly
responded to political pressure from prosecutors to overrule
Ryan. Just eighteen months after the court's decision, the
legislature rewrote the statute so that defendants would be
strictly liable for the full quantity of narcotics possessed.'
Prosecutors were troubled by the Ryan holding because they
claim that proving a defendant's knowledge of quantity in-
volves insuperable evidentiary difficulties. Indeed, the case
inspired numerous appeals from defendants seeking to reduce
sentences and charges because prosecutors failed to prove
mens rea.'3 Accordingly, much of the discussion surrounding
Ryan centered on the practical matter of what kind of evidence
is sufficient to establish a defendant's knowledge of quanti-
ty.14
Ryan raises a more fundamental question, however, which
survives the legislative overruling of the holding. This concerns
the fairness of mandating a mens rea for quantity, when a
mens rea is already established for the other elements of a
crime. The question has two components: the fairness to a
defendant and the fairness to society.' Consider again the
woman with the mistaken belief about quantity. Arguably, it
' See Matt Gryta, Dillon Urges Quick Response to Counter Drug Ruling, BUFF.
NEWS, Feb. 22, 1994, at B4; Gary Spencer, Asembly Compromices on Ryan Bill,
N.Y.LJ., June 29, 1994, at 1; Gary Spencer & Cerisse Anderzon, Drug Ruling
Targeted for Reform, N.Y.J, Feb. 15, 1994, at L
Ryan, 82 N.Y.2c1 at 501-02, 626 N.B.2d at 54-55, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38.
"Id. at 501, 626 N.B.2d at 54, 605 N.Y.S.2dl at 238.
N.Y. PENAL L. § 220.06 (ConsoL 1995); e also Gary Spencer, Evidence for
'Ryan! Weight Proof Described, N.Y.LJ., June 8, 1995, at 1.
' See Cerisse Anderson, Appellate Bench Gridlock on Ryan Issue, N.Y1LJ.,
Sept. 28, 1994, at 1; Cerisse Anderson, Appellate Courts Split on Interpreting
Ryan, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 14, 1994, at 1; Steven W. Fisher, Ryan: A View from the
Bench, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 1994, at L
" See Spencer, supra note 12; Fisher, supra note 13; Grand Jury Can Infer
Knowledge of Drug Weight from Packaging, N.YL.J., Aug. 25, 1995, at 1.
"See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offensces, 33 COLU!. L. REV. 55, 68
(1933) and infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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would be unfair to subject her to as severe a penalty as the
woman who was aware of the quantity. She did not know-and
perhaps could not be expected to know-how much heroin she
possessed.
On the other hand, one could argue that it is unfair to
society not to punish the woman according to the actual quan-
tity possessed. Because a defendant's mental state can be diffi-
cult to prove, a mens rea requirement places significant admin-
istrative and labor burdens on prosecutors and the judicial
system. This in turn creates an opportunity for culpable defen-
dants to escape liability by feigning a lack of awareness. More-
over, the woman in this scenario is guilty of a crime: although
she had a mistaken belief as to quantity, she still knowingly
possessed heroin. In short, it can be argued that to place the
burden of an additional mens rea requirement for quantity on
society accomplishes little more than protecting criminals.
This Comment will analyze Ryan principally by evaluating
the fairness of imposing a mens rea requirement for quantity.
Part I presents a brief overview of the historical and philosoph-
ical underpinnings of mens rea and strict liability. It examines
the traditional strict liability offense-the social-welfare crime.
It then looks at the strict liability enforcement of enhanced
penalty provisions in narcotics offenses in the federal court.
Part II provides an overview of the Ryan decision. Part III
analyzes Ryan. It argues that the court's holding is correct
because the enforcement of strict liability for narcotics offenses
would be an unwarranted departure from the traditional strict
liability offense. This Part further argues that the strict liabili-
ty enforcement of enhanced penalties is not justified by proving
a threshold mens rea for the other elements of the crime. Fi-
nally, Part III argues that although the court's holding was the
product of statutory interpretation, there exist constitutional
due process grounds for the holding.
I. MENS REA AND STRICT LIABILITY
A. Mens Rea
The link between criminal punishment and proof of mental
culpability is an enduring tenet of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. Through much of Anglo-American history, courts and
[Vol. 61: 1011
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lawmakers have abided by the principle that a person who
intentionally commits a bad act deserves to be punished more
than a person who commits the same act inadvertently. 6
Even when an individual's act leads to gravely harmful conse-
quences, the law will not permit severe punishment without
some proof of mental culpability.'7 Only then is the full force
of the state's power to punish brought to bear on an individual.
In this sense, the mens rea requirement is at the heart of the
criminal law; it is what justifies the punishment of one who
commits a socially harmful act.
A prime reason for the enduring relevance of the mens rea
concept is that it is simple and intuitive. The distinction be-
tween an intentional and unintentional act is instinctive. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, even a dog knows
the difference between being kicked and accidently stepped
on.'8 Equally instinctive is the urge to blame and punish for
an intentionally offensive act. Vengeance itself-perhaps the
most deeply intuitive response to a bad act-is fueled by an
appreciation of culpability. It is the deliberate and calculated
offense that sparks the desire for vengeance and retribution,
and serves as its justification." By contrast, blaming someone
for an act done inadvertently is widely understood to be un-
fair. o
18 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (Mhe ancient require-
ment of a culpable state of mind . . . is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a conmequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.'). See general-
ly Emilio S. Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1 (1964); Francis B. Sayre, Mfens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 993 (1932)
("By the second half of the seventeenth century, it was universally accepted law
that an evil intent was as necessary for felony as the act itself).
1" Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1803 (1994) ([lImposing severe
punishments for offenses that require no mens rea vuld seem incongruous.'). See
also Morissette 342 U.S. at 251 n.5 (stating that punishment must fit the offender
and that "such ends would seem illusory if there were no mental element in
crime").
15 OLIVER WENDELL HOMEs, THE COMMON LAW 6 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ecL,
1963).
" Sayre, supra note 16, at 975 ("Vengeance seeks a blameworthy victim; and
blameworthiness rests upon fault or evil design.").
I3 Sayre, supra note 15, at 56 ("To inflict substantial punishment upon one
who is morally entirely innocent, who caused injury through reasonable mistake,




This intuitive understanding is most strikingly reflected in
retributive theories of justice.2' Retribution is fueled by the
moral concept that guilt and punishment are preeminently
personal. An individual must merit the punishment he
receivesY In this sense, retribution depends upon mens rea
for its meaning- without evidence of personal guilt, punishment
becomes a gratuitous act.' Conversely, because each individu-
al has the power of moral choice, to punish those who choose
badly is an act of respect for individuals' existence as auton-
omous beings.'
The longstanding social consensus on the importance of
personal culpability underlies contemporary decisions on con-
viction and punishment. Proof of personal culpability is a
mainstay requirement for all crimes which provoke public
outrage and a need for retribution-rape, robbery, murder.'
On the other hand, the crimes which do not require culpabili-
ty-largely the so-called social-welfare offenses-spark far less
social opprobrium and generally carry moderate penalties."
Yet despite this underlying clarity of principle, history
" While most obviously linked to retributive theories, mens rea is a prerequi-
site for meaningful punishment under many theories. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 30 (2d ed. 1961) ('The deterrent theory is workable only if the culprit
has knowledge of the legal sanction.... The retributive theory presupposes moral
guilt; incapacitation supposes social danger; and the reformative aim is out of
place if the offender's sense of values is not warped.")
2 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, 158-73 (1968). The pure idea
of a criminal embracing his punishment has come to seem archaic; since the late
nineteenth century, the utilitarian notion that punishment should be forward look-
ing-i.e., should promote the future good of society-has gained prominence. But
as Hart notes, at two critical stages, punishment looks back to the criminal's act,
not forward: "At the conviction stage, if punishment is to be justified at all, the
criminal's act must be that of a responsible agent: that is, it must be the act of
one who could have kept the law which he has broken. And at the sentence stage,
the punishment must bear some sort of relationship to the act: it must in some
sense 'fit' it or be 'proportionate' to it." Id. at 160.
2 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 286, 287 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing) ("it is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is per-
sonal").
I Culpability requirements are also well-suited to peculiarly American concepts
of individualism and freedom of choice. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
252 (1952).
' Id. at 260 (stating that the crimes which require mens rea are those "which
stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and arouse public demand for
retribution, the penalty is high, and . . . the infamy is that of a felony.").
"' Id. at 254-55 n.14.
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shows that the concept of mens rea can be complex and mal-
leableY While proof of some form of mental state has long
been a requirement of punishment, the level of guilt, the meth-
od of proving it and its relative importance in the criminal pro-
cess, have all varied through time.' In approaching mens rea,
lawmakers are influenced by the kinds of crimes prevalent in
society and the requirements of regulation and enforcement. In
this way the instinctive urge to blame and punish is tailored to
the demands of the social moment.'
Thus, mens rea has taken different shapes through histo-
ry 0 In its most rudimentary form, it exists as a kind of gen-
eralized moral blameworthiness. In the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, when trials were often conducted through battle or
ordeal, evidence of the defendant's general moral character
could determine whether he would need to face trial at all."
In the fifteenth century, mens rea began to be shaped by the
widespread influence of Christian conceptions of morality.
Within the church, wrongdoing took on an almost exclusively
mental character. Under this influence, a defendant's malicious
motive in committing an act became the central determinant of
his guilt." This was malice in the interior sense of vicious
=' Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) ('The doctrines of... mens
ea... [and] mistake ... have historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law
and changing religious, moral, philosophical and medical views of the nature of
man.").
" See generally supra note 16; Binavince, supra note 16.
2 There is an enduring tension between the demands of society's collective
well-being, and values that protect individual liberty and justice. This is reflected
in the criminal law through the relative prominence accorded the mens rea re-
quirement, as against strict liability crimes. Though these interests are shifting,
the concept of personal culpability has always endured. See Sayre, supra note 15,
at 68.
'o Prior to the twelfth century, mental intent was not a prerequisite for con-
viction. Yet the concept still hovered over the law. For one thing, the most preva-
lent crimes of the period-waylaying, robbery and rape-carried implicit proof of
intent in the actus reus. Additionally, although lack of intent could not preclude
conviction for killing, this did factor into punishment. Even in pro-Norman times,
the laws of Alfred imposed the penalty of death only on thoe who intentionally
killed. By the eleventh century, the king routinely granted pardons to those who
had killed in self-defense. See Sayre, supra note 16, at 980-82.
" Sayre, supra note 16, at 976. A person who had led a blameworthy life was
thought more likely to be culpable-and also more expendablo--than an upstand-
ing citizen. Id.
' Sins were born in the mind; the extent of an individual's gult, and there-
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and evil desire. Modern conceptions of knowledge and intent
were not relevant to these religious concerns.'
A variant of these doctrines persisted into modem times
with the "moral-doctrine" and 'lesser-legal-wrong" theories of
culpability.' According to these theories, the central require-
ment of culpability is satisfied when the defendant knowingly
engages in some form of immoral or illegal activity. His lack of
knowledge and intent as to the specific elements of the crime
then become irrelevant. For example, courts often justify the
enforcement of strict liability for statutory rape under a moral-
doctrine theory: because the defendant intentionally engaged
in the presumed moral wrong of sexual activity, his lack of
knowledge of his partner's age is irrelevant.35 Similarly, under
a lesser-legal-wrong theory, a defendant may be convicted of
coercing a minor into prostitution, even though he mistakenly
believed the young woman to be an adult.3" Because the de-
fendant knowingly committed the lesser-legal-wrong of coerc-
ing an adult into prostitution, he is fully culpable of the great-
er offense of inducing a minor into prostitution.
For the most part, the modern form of the mens rea re-
quirement tends to de-emphasize the strictly moral quality of
the defendant's mental state, except by implication. Instead,
modern penal laws generally split culpability into levels of
fore the penance he owed before God, were essentially internal phenomena. Be-
cause the canonists were a dominating influence on rulers of the period and often
direct participants in judicial proceedings, the religious conception of guilt became
prevalent in the criminal law. See Binavince, supra note 16, at 14-17 and Sayre,
supra note 16, at 984-89.
The ultimate extension of this concept is to eliminate actus reus altogether
and make criminal guilt purely dependent on a culpable state of mind. While this
obviously extreme position has never become part of the criminal law, it is echoed
in the Model Penal Code's subjectivist approach to crime. Under the Modern Penal
Code, a person is guilty of an attempted crime when his conduct would have con-
stituted a crime if the facts were as he mistakenly supposed them to be. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(2) (Official Draft 1962).
' For example, by the late fifteenth century, there were two broad categories
of murder-with and without malice. The former was punished by death, the lat-
ter by branding on the thumb. Sayre, supra note 16 at 996-97.
"See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.1, at 581-84 (1986).
' See discussion in United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 497-
98 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
' United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972).
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awareness including intent, knowledge, recklessness and neg-
ligenceY Rather than grades of immorality per se, these lev-
els evince different degrees of consciousness of wrongdoing. An
inference about the defendant's moral state may-but need
not-be drawn from the conclusions reached about his level of
awareness. Additionally, modem penal laws require mens rea
to be particularized not only for the crime as a whole, but for
each separate element of the crime.?
B. Pure Strict Liability
The enduring link between mental culpability and punish-
ment has not gone unchallenged. The direct alternative to
requiring proof of mental intent is strict liability. Strict liabili-
ty requires that a determination of guilt and punishment be
based on the defendant's actions. The mental state with which
he undertook those actions is irrelevant5 9
Advocates of a strict liability criminal regime attack the
mens rea requirement as unsound, both pragmatically and
philosophically. The practical arguments speak to the eviden-
tiary burdens mens rea requirements place on prosecutors."'
Depending on the crime, proving an individual's mental aware-
ness can be a difficult, inherently problematic tasL41 Faking
M NIODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (Official Draft 1962); N.Y. PENAL LAW ff 15.00,
15.05 (METnney 1989).
The practice whereby culpability levels are particularized to the spcific ele-
ments of a crime is sometimes designated mens rea in the secial sense. This is
distinct from the general doctrine of mens rea which is the broad principle that
wrongdoing should not be punished without evidence of a guilty mind. See Alan
Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive
Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1577 (1978). The initial emer-
gence of a particularized mens rea paralleled the declining influence of the
canoninsts at the dawn of the Enlightenment. This served the practical purpoe of
facilitating criminal prosecutions. The previous emphasis on pure moral guilt had
required proof of a willful and malicious intent for conviction, precluding prosacu-
tion of many culpable individuals. By the seventeenth century, mons rea meant
not so much moral guilt but "reference to a precise intent at a given tim.! See
Sayre, supra note 16, at 994-1004.
' See Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1575-79.
" Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("The purposa and
obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the
prosecution's path to conviction....").
"See Fisher, supra note 13, at 1. The difficulties and administrative demands
of proving mental state were among the early justifications for criminal strict
liability. In the 1852 case, Regina v. Woodrow, which upheld a strict liability con-
1995] 1019
BROOELYNLAWREVIEW
a lack of awareness is correspondingly easy, which thereby pro-
vides guilty people an opportunity to escape punishment, at
great detriment to society. This has been cited as support for
the allegedly greater deterrent power of strict liability." De-
priving cunning defendants of the opportunity to escape pun-
ishment by feigning a lack of culpability would tend to discour-
age would-be offenders from crime. Moreover, the general in-
crease in the efficiency of punishment and conviction under a
strict liability regime, would act as a significant disincentive to
would-be criminals.43
The arguments run that, given the complexity of modern
society, the criminal law should first strive to protect the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the social organization." Concerns
about an individual's personal awareness and responsibility
may be luxuries of the past.45 In an advanced post-industrial
society, notions of individual responsibility may come to seem
increasingly irrelevant. Social science questions whether per-
sonal responsibility for wrongdoing can ever be more than an
idealized, largely chimerical concept."
The Constitution does not require proof of culpability as a
prerequisite for criminal conviction and punishment.47 The
Supreme Court has also established that enforcing certain
criminal statutes on a strict liability basis does not violate due
viction for the sale of adulterated tobacco, the court noted that "the public incon-
venience would be much greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove
knowledge." See Binavince, supra note 16, at 30 (citing Woodrow).
See generally Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1585-88.
Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1585-88.
In United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), one of the earliest Supreme
Court cases dealing with strict criminal liability, the Court engaged in this balanc-
ing act. The defendant, a pharmacist, was convicted of mislabeling drugs, although
there was no proof of his mental state. The Court noted that "Congress weighed
the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil
of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the
latter was the result preferably to be avoided." Id. at 254.
' But see Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1579 ("e 'better view' opposes strict
liability. It is frequently asserted that strict criminal liability is unjust, that legis-
latures ought to refrain from imposing it, and that courts at least ought to pre-
sume that legislatures did not intend to impose it unless that intention is explicit-
ly stated.").
See Binavince, supra note 16, at 27-32.
"This may be because historically in America "intent was so inherent in the
idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation." Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
[Vol. 61:I1011
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process or equal protection per se.4' However, the Court has
yet to establish whether and in what way due process might
limit the kinds of crimes that may be punished on a strict
liability basis. 9
Currently, strict liability has a well-established, but limit-
ed foothold in the criminal law. It appears in essentially two
forms. The first form is pure strict liability, where an offense is
prosecuted without any reference to a defendant's mental
state. Generally, these crimes are the so-called social-welfare
or regulatory offenses."
The second form is partial strict liability. These offenses
require proof of what may be characterized as a "threshold
mens rea," whereby prosecutors establish the defendant's men-
tal state for some, but not all, of the elements of a crime. Ele-
ments or factors linked to enhanced penalties are applied on a
strict liability basis at either the conviction phase of a trial or
the penalty phase. Federal enhanced penalty provisions and
statutes are applied according to a threshold mens rea theory,
representing a significant new incursion of strict liability into
the criminal laws."
The social-welfare offense is the primary application of
pure strict liability in the criminal law. 2 This entirely statu-
tory offense is designed not to punish, but to promote the so-
cial good through regulation of those businesses and other
activities that pose a particular risk to society.' A person who
unwittingly violates a social-welfare statute is subject to the
identical penalties as one who acts with calculation and cun-
ning.
A social-welfare offense therefore is more akin to a breach
of a civil regulation than a crime. It creates a kind of collective
0 Beginning with Balint in 1922, the Supreme Court has enforced a series of
criminal statutes on a strict liability basis. For a general history, ce Saltzman,
supra note 38.
- See discussion in United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 515-17
(E..N.Y. 1993) ("The outer limits of what is permissible have not been drawn,
but such limits certainly exist.").
See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-126 and accompanying text.
See generally Sayre, supra note 15.
s The emphasis is on "social betterment rather than the punishment of the




civil right of action for the social good.' In an industrial, ur-
ban society the improper or hazardous operation of otherwise
legitimate businesses, for example, pose real risks to the
health, safety and welfare of the populace. Because of the po-
tential scope and seriousness of these risks, lawmakers choose
to criminalize regulatory matters; while the established crimi-
nal law machinery is the most effective means of ensuring
enforcement, the violations in themselves do not constitute an
intrinsic wrong.5 Thus, the origins of the social-welfare of-
fense are, in the first instance, practical and political rather
than ethical and religious.
For these reasons, the social-welfare offense is perhaps the
most representative type of malum prohibitum crime. Malum
prohibitum crimes are purely statutory creations, with no clear
antecedents in the common law. This is in contrast to the other
main category of crime, mala in se, which constitutes the tradi-
tional common law crimes.56 Besides their different origin,
these two categories of crimes are different in nature. The
common law crimes are intrinsically evil, and widely perceived
to be so. Society intuitively understands the moral wrong and
social danger of rape, robbery and murder.57 Certain malum
prohibitum crimes may come to seem obviously criminal as
well: for instance, a landlord's failure to install window guards
in apartments with children 8 or a pharmacist mislabeling
drugs. 9 Yet this perception comes only after public and politi-
cal debate has determined that the danger posed by a partic-
ular activity warrants a criminal statute. Potential dangers of
" Tenement House v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 169 (1915) ("This statute . * *
must be viewed as defining, not a crime in the strict sense, but a civil right of
action for the benefit of the public.").
The Congressional intent in creating social-welfare offenses statutes is to
make regulations "more effective" by providing for criminal conviction of violations.
Morissette v. United States 342 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1952).
" Tenement House, 215 N.Y. at 168 ("The element of conscious wrongdoing, the
guilty mind accompanying the guilty act, is associated with the concept of crimes
that are punished as infamous.").
" See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 245-55 (stating that the malumn prohibitum
crimes are those "which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and
arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high ... and the infamy is
that of a felony").
I People v. Nemadi, 140 Misc.2d 712, 531 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y.
County 1988).
' United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
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all sorts lie hidden in a complex, industrial society; in creating
malum prohibitum crimes, legislatures seek to identify and
protect against these dangers.'
The decision to enforce these statutes on a strict liability
basis is often made by the courts. Although legislatures are
free to dispense with mens rea requirements expressly, stat-
utes are often silent or ambiguous as to their culpability re-
quirements. When faced with such a statute, courts must con-
strue the appropriate mens rea requirement. The courts' osten-
sible goal is to discern what culpability requirements best
comport with legislative intent. In making this determination,
however, courts have usually examined the underlying fairness
of dispensing with the mens rea requirement in a given situa-
tion.
A frequently stated justification for applying strict liability
to social-welfare offense statutes is that doing so increases the
statute's effectiveness in promoting social betterment6 1 This
outweighs the injustice of permitting the conviction of an un-
witting offender.62 Arguably, this reasoning could be applied
to diverse crimes as a broad justification for strict liability.'
However there are three characteristics of the social-welfare
offense that mitigate the harshness of strict liability. First,
they usually carry only moderate penalties. Second, because
the statutes regulate obviously hazardous activities, potential
offenders are "on notice" of their exposure to liability. Third,
' The social-welfare offense emerged in Britain and America in the mid-nine-
teenth century, with the development of the modem industrial age. The hazards
created by new industries and wide-spread urbanization seemed to create a new
kind of crime. Professor Sayre identified two historical reasons why legislatures
felt compelled to create this new kind of offense: (1) the shift of emphansis away
from protection of individual interests; and (2) the practical need for criminal law
machinery to enforce regulations. Sayre, supra note 15, at 65-67; oce also
Binavince, supra note 16, at 27-31 (wThe earlier premise . . . was the security of
the individual... to insulate him from the injustice of the social order was its
fundamental purpose ... Modem society though demanded] a more extensive and
effective regulation of social life.").
nSee Nemadi, 140 lsc.2d at 716, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (upholding the strict
liability enforcement of a statute penalizing landlords for failure to install window
guards). The court noted that [elffective enforcement of such broad based pro-
grams would be illusory if intent were made an element of these offenses.! Id.
'United States v. Staples, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1812 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that strict liability enforcement of statutes necessarily involves a pos-
sibility of injustice).
'3 United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 242, 259 (1952).
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the statutes are only enforced against those responsible for the
hazard.
Perhaps the chief mitigating factor is the moderate penal-
ty typically attached to public welfare offenses." One com-
mentator has called the possibility of subjecting an unwitting
offender to a severe penalty "revolting to the community sense
of justice."65 Society, however, readily will tolerate penalizing
an unwitting offender with a moderate fine-particularly
where doing so might contribute to the general social better-
ment. Thus the traditional use of mens rea as justifying pun-
ishment is not needed.66
In addition to moderate penalties, another mitigating
factor of these statutes is that they target only those already
on "notice" that they have a heightened duty to the public.
This "notice" is implicit in the responsibilities of persons in-
volved in businesses that directly impact upon the public wel-
fare. A person who deals with food preparation, hazardous
substances or pharmaceuticals should know of the potential
public hazards involved in these fields because it is his or her
job to know. Thus alerted, such persons, therefore, take affir-
mative steps at their peril to protect the public welfare.67
Moreover, liability is limited only to those with an opportunity
to protect against the harm. Courts will consider whether the
defendant was "helpless" to prevent the harm despite the due
" While recognizing a social value in strict liability enforcement of certain
statutes, courts have long been reluctant to construe a strict liability crime where
the statute carries a significant penalty. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796; Price v.
Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 29 (1918) ("The scope of the duty is one prob.
lem; the extent to which the breach may be visited with punishment, another.").
" Sayre, supra note 15, at 72 ("To subject defendants entirely free from moral
blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the communi-
ty sense of justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can long
endure.").
" Tenement House v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 169 (1915) (MThe law is not
oblivious of considerations of degree . .. there is nothing that need shock any
mind in the payment of a small pecuniary penalty.").
' Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. at 1798 (An individual in a responsible
relation to the danger from which the statute seeks to protect the public, bears
the risk of liability). See, e.g., Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1582. Professor
Saltzman observes that statutes that target only those engaged in a particular
business significantly decrease the potential injustice of strict liability enforcement.
The individual is considered to have "'assumed the risk:' criminal liability is im-
posed only upon those who chose to engage in an activity for which such liability
is a necessary risk, regardless of the care taken."
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vigilance. For instance, a statute making a landlord liable for
prostitution that occurs on his premises will not be enforced
when there is only a single incident of prostitution. This is
because the landlord could not prevent this one incident with
even a high level of vigilance." Similarly, employees of a cor-
poration which has committed a violation are not liable unless
they are in a "responsible relation" to the harm. Thus where a
corporation has violated the statute, only those employees who
had the authority and responsibility to take preventive mea-
sures will be held liable.69
Despite these restrictions, the standard of enforcement is
more like strict liability than negligence. The entirely helpless
are not liable. But those with a duty to act under the statutes
are held to a standard of care greater than reasonableness.
The Supreme Court has characterized the burden as "strin-
gent" and "perhaps onerous." But because of their responsible
relation to a known public hazard, this standard is what "the
public has a right to expect."70
, 'The social-welfare offense statute at issue in Tenement House compelled the
owner of a tenement house to "prevent at his peril a vicious use which can rarely
be continued without his fault" (e.g., use of the premises for prostitution). Judge
Cardozo held that liability would not extend to situations where the owner was
helpless to prevent occurrence, despite all due vigilance. Tenement House, 215 N.Y.
at 167.
"United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). See also United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975) ("The duty imposed by Congress on responsible
corporate agents is, we emphasize, one that requires the highest standard of fore-
sight and vigilance, but ... does not require that which is objectively impossi-
ble.).
70 Park, 421 U.S. at 671. Nevertheless, courts often characterize cocial-welfare
offenses in terms that suggest a negligence standard. For instance, in Moriscette,
the Supreme Court noted that often the offenses 'are not in the nature of positive
aggressions or invasions ... but are in the nature of neglect where the law re-
quires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty." Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 242, 255-56 (1952). The Court further noted that "[t]he accused, if he does
not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care
than society might reasonably expect .. . from one who assumed his responsibili-
ties.? Id. For further discussion of this issue, see Saltzman, supra note 38, at
1581-85; see also Tenement House, 215 N.Y. at 167, where the court observes that




C. Threshold Mens Rea in Enhanced Penalty Cases
Over the past decade, strict liability has emerged in a new
form in the enforcement of enhanced penalties for narcotics
offenses. Driven by escalating social alarm over the nation's
drug problem, federal and state legislatures have created stat-
utes and other provisions mandating significantly enhanced
penalties linked to particular aggravating elements of drug
crimes.7 The aggravating elements include: the type of con-
trolled substance possessed," the quantity possessed, 3
whether there were sales to a minor, 4 and the proximity of
drug sales to schools."5
While courts consistently have enforced the enhanced
penalties on a strict liability basis, 6 prosecutors must prove a
"knowing" mens rea for the elements of the substantive crime.
This creates what may be called a "threshold mens rea," estab-
lished at trial for the underlying offense." Courts hold that
this threshold mens rea, establishing a base level of criminal
or anti-social behavior, is sufficient culpability to justify impos-
ing a wide range of sentences under enhanced penalty provi-
sions."
" See generally Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The Unit-
ed States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search
for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192-
94 (1993).
- 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing for enhanced penalty
for possession of crack cocaine).
73 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
7' 21 U.S.C. § 859 (1994).
7' 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994).
71 United States v. de Velasquez, 28 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 679 (1994).
7 This Comment employs the term 'threshold mens rea" as a way of distin-
guishing this apparently new kind of strict liability (in the absence of any iden-
tifying label used by the federal courts). See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie,
825 F. Supp. 485, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Abandoning culpability distinctions at the
sentencing stage assumes that "once a person crosses the threshold into the feder-
al narcotics laws, the mens rea principle falls away and, thereafter, only acts
count . . . ").
" Id. Antecedents of this kind of strict liability include the moral-wrong and
lesser-legal-wrong doctrines of culpability. Like the federal-enhanced penalty provi-
sions, these doctrines assume that culpability is necessary only to establish a base
level of criminality or immorality. For a discussion of the moral- and lesser-wrong
doctrines, see supra note 34-36 and accompanying text. With the notable exception
of statutory rape and felony murder, these theories have found little practical
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This new application of strict liability is made possible by
several innovations in federal criminal law instituted by Con-
gress in the 1980s. Congress, responding to concerns about
judges' discretionary power at sentencing, enacted legislation
designed to control the sentencing phase of the criminal pro-
ceeding. 9 Such legislation took two forms: the Sentencing
Guidelines, a set of instructions applicable to all federal
crimes; and a series of mandatory-minimum statutes, prescrib-
ing penalties for certain kinds of narcotics and firearm offens-
es. Both forms of legislation link punishment to various factors
that are not elements of the substantive crime-such as aggra-
vating factors of the crime or aspects of the defendant's per-
sonal history. Courts apply these factors on a strict liability
basis.8"
The lack of a scienter requirement has less of an impact
on the defendant under the Sentencing Guidelines. In deter-
mining the sentence, the Guidelines instruct judges to address
multiple factors related both to the crime and the defendant's
history and circumstances."' Thus, a particular aggravating
application in the criminal law. A tangentially related practice is the strict liability
enforcement of the jurisdictional element in certain federal crimes. The jurisdic-
tional element is generally a morally neutral factor which could not be construed
as an aggravating element of the substantive crime. United States v. Kierschke,
315 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1963). The defendant's knowledge of this factor is "irrele-
vant" because it does not bear on his criminality. United States v. Baher, 693
F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982). However, scienter requirements for the substantive
elements of the crime remain in effect. Thus, in the federal crime of possession of
a stolen automobile, prosecutors must prove the defendant knowingly possessed the
car, and knew that the car was stolen. But it need not be shown that the defen-
dant knew the car was transported in interstate commerce, because this is a pure-
ly jurisdictional element. Pilgrim v. United States, 266 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1962).
z" These Congressional initiatives included the Sentencing Reform Act, the
Sentencing Guidelines, and the mandatory-minimum statutes. The initiatives were
intended to make sentencing more certain by limiting judicial discretion. Congress
also was motivated by widespread disaffection with the rehabilitative model of
punishment. See Hatch, supra note 71, at 62.
The mandatory-minimum statutes are silent as to mens rca. Through statu-
tory construction, courts have determined that Congress intended these penalties
to be enforced on a strict liability basis. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying
text. The Sentencing Guidelines originally contained a provision instructing the
court to consider the defendant's mental state, but this was later dropped; see
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 530 (EMD.N.Y. 1993). Cur-
rently, the Guidelines do not require a sentencing court to consider a defendant's
knowledge of quantity. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING M&NUAL, § 1b1.3, comment n.2 (West 1994); see also United States v. de
Velasquez, 28 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1994).
"I Each factor is given a particular weight. Some factors, such as aggravating
19951 1027
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
element applied on a strict liability basis is not the sole deter-
minant of the defendant's fate. 2 The mandatory-minimum
statutes are far more severe. These statutes require judges to
impose a specified minimum sentence linked to an aggravating
factor.' Thus, a defendant's mistake of fact as to quantity can
carry very serious consequences.'
Courts interpreting the mens rea requirements of both the
mandatory-minimum statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines
have emphasized their tendency to bifurcate the trial into
discrete phases: a trial phase and a penalty phase.' At the
trial phase, prosecutors establish a threshold mens rea to con-
vict the defendant of the substantive crime. At the penalty
phase, therefore, there is no need to prove an additional mens
rea for any of the aggravating factors linked to severity of
factors in the crime, will add to the sentence. Mitigating factors, based on the
defendant's family circumstances or history, will reduce the sentence. See Cordoba-
Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 530.
' See United States v. Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y.), sentence vacated
and remanded, 12 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993). Additionally, because the Sentencing
Guidelines permit a measure of discretion, theoretically the judge, in determining
the sentence, may take into account evidence of the defendant's mistake of fact.
Id.
, For instance, under the substantive crime of possession with intent to dis.
tribute, prosecutors establish a threshold mens rea for the defendant's knowledge
of possession of a controlled substance according to the statute's requirements.
After conviction, the judge determines punishment based on the mandatory mini.
mum statute for quantity, without reference to the defendant's knowledge of quan-
tity. See United States v. Pineda, 847 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988).
Another factor contributing to the relative harshness of the mandatory-mini-
mum statutes are the sentencing effects of so-called "cliffs." "Cliffs" refers to the
fact that a defendant could receive dramatically different sentences for an almost
identical amount of drugs, depending on whether the quantity possessed is just
under or just over the statutory threshold. This effect is much diminished under
the Sentencing Guidelines because of the greater number of intermediary grades.
See Steven J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV., 199, 209 (1993).
" In practice, the severity of mandatory minimums has been somewhat tem-
pered by the tendency of prosecutors to use them as bargaining chips. The New
York narcotics laws that also link penalty to quantity possessed originally had a
mandatory-prosecution provision, but this was later dropped as unduly harsh. See
Schulhofer, supra note 83, at 202-08.
' In fact, under the Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors need not even allege
certain facts linked to enhanced penalties. United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d
677, 679 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Schulhofer, supra note 83, at 205-06 (Mandatory
minimums are fact based, not charge based. Where a judge finds by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant possessed a certain quantity, then the en-
hanced penalty is imposed.).
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sentence. These are not part of the "corpus delicti" of the
crime, and therefore are factors beyond the reach of mens
reaY8
6
Courts applying penalties on this basis repeatedly empha-
size that the defendant's culpability has been sufficiently es-
tablished at trial. The courts reason that any level of involve-
ment in illegal narcotics activity constitutes such an obvious
wrong that all further culpability distinctions are pointless8 7
This serves to distinguish these cases from pure strict liability
cases and implicitly endorses the continuing importance of a
culpability requirement.
Over the past decade, the Second Circuit has heard a se-
ries of appeals of enhanced penalties imposed under a thresh-
old mens rea theory in narcotics cases. These penalties arise
from statutes or Guidelines linking sentence lengths to various
aggravating factors, including the type of drug, the proximity
of the sale to a school house and the quantity in the possession
of the defendant at the time of arrest. Through the years, the
Second Circuit has developed an almost pure strict liability
standard for these aggravating factors. The court precludes a
defendant from using lack of knowledge as an affirmative de-
fense-even where knowledge of the aggravating element was
not reasonably foreseeable.
The Second Circuit elucidated its basic position in United
States v. Fau,s a 1985 case involving what has come to be
known as the school-yard enhanced-penalty statute. The
school-yard statute mandates an additional prison term when
a defendant distributes a controlled substance within 1,000
feet of a school."9 The enhanced-penalty statute does not spec-
ify a mens rea for knowledge of the school's proximity;, the stat-
ute for the substantive crime of possession with intent to dis-
tribute a controlled substance specifies "knowingly" as the
culpability requirement."0
The defendant in Falu claimed he should not be subject to
the enhanced penalty because he did not know he was near a
school. He argued that the court should construe the statute as
United States v. de Velasquez, 28 F.3d 2, 5 (1994).
Id. at 5; United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1985).
776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
21 U.S.C. § 860 (Supp. II 1990).
" Falu, 776 F.2d at 48; 21 U.S.C. § 845(a) (1988).
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requiring knowledge, because otherwise a defendant would not
have "fair notice" of the enhanced penalties. He pointed out
that in urban areas, schools are often not clearly visi-
ble-indeed, the prosecution stipulated that the school could
not be seen from where the drug sale occurred."
Nevertheless, the court imposed the enhanced penalty on a
strict liability basis. It held that to do otherwise would "under-
cut" the congressional intent behind the statute, which was to
create an entirely drug-free zone in areas surrounding
schools. 2 The court further held that the statute was a ratio-
nal means toward that end; yet the court did not address how
and to what extent imputing a knowledge requirement onto
the statute would undercut the statute's effectiveness.93
According to the court, it was not "criminalizing otherwise
innocent activity" by imposing the enhanced penalty. The
defendant's culpability had been proven at trial, said the court,
providing a threshold of "obviously anti-social conduct."94 The
court acknowledged that schools are not always recognizable,
but held that persons involved in narcotics should "bear the
burden" of ascertaining whether a school is nearby or face the
enhanced penalty."
In United State v. Collado-Gomez,96 using essentially the
same reasoning, the Second Circuit again enforced an en-
hanced-penalty statute without proof of knowledge. In Collado-
Gomez, the statute mandated additional penalties for posses-
sion of crack cocaine. The defendant claimed he thought the
drug he possessed was heroin, not crack cocaine. Unlike Falu,
the defendant in Collado-Gomez mounted a constitutional
challenge, arguing that due process required proof of knowl-
edge before the enhanced penalty could be applied.97
Despite the fact that the defendant was expressly chal-
lenging the statute on constitutional grounds, the court hardly
9 Falu, 776 F.2d at 49.
2 Id. at 50.
9 Id.
" Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited four federal cases; three of
these involved strict liability for jurisdictional elements, and not enhanced penal.
ties. Thus, they do not support the court's position.
" Id. at 50.
" 834 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 280-81.
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elaborated on its reasoning in Falu. It held that due process
was satisfied because Congress had a "clear, unequivocal and
rational" purpose in enacting the statute.8 The court ob-
served that, like the enhanced penalties of the school-yard
statute, Congress enacted enhanced penalties for possession of
crack cocaine in order to deter "a particularly insidious drug
transaction." 9 However the court appeared to sidestep the
fact that the defendant was not challenging the constitutional-
ity of the statute per se, but its enforcement without proof of
mens rea.
00
At this point, the Second Circuit had clearly established
that mandatory-minimum statutes did not require proof that a
defendant have knowledge of the aggravating factor linked to
punishment. °' However it remained unresolved whether a
defendant could establish as an affirmative defense that he
could not have reasonably foreseen the quantity possessed. In
United States v. Ekwunoh,0 2 District Court Judge Jack B.
Weinstein sought to establish a foreseeability requirement for
quantity.
In Ekwunoh, Judge Weinstein determined that the
defendant's sentence should not be dependent solely on the
quantity of narcotics she actually possessed because that
amount was not foreseeable. The defendant, sent by her boy-
friend, had collected a suitcase at the airport which contained
"Id at 281.
"Id.
Id. Moreover, the court dismissed the possibility that proof of knowledge for
the aggravating factor would protect individuals of limited culpability. Such a
requirement, the court held, would only protect dthose who are simply indifferent
about the illegal narcotic drugs they sell.7 Id. The court obrerved that the
defendant's claim that he believed he possessed not crack but heroin "points up
the remoteness of the danger" that enhanced penalties would be unjustly applied.
Id. at n. L
1 In United States v. Pineda, 847 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit
applied identical reasoning to the quantity issue. The defendant caimed that the
strict liability enforcement of the enhanced-penalty statute linked to quantity vio-
lated both his due process and equal protection rights. In its one page opinion, the
court dismissed the due process challenge as "frivolous,' recounting its reaoning
from Falu and Collado-Gomez. Id. at 65. The court dismissed the equal protection
claim after finding that Congress had a rational basis for classiting penalties
based on weight. The court did not identify this basis. Moreover, as in Collado-
Gomez, the court side-stepped the defendants specific constitutional challenge of
the statute's lack of mens rea requirement. Id.
2" 813 F. Supp. 168 (ED.N.Y. 1993).
19951
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
more than a kilogram of heroin. She had made similar pick-
ups for her boyfriend, a drug smuggler, on previous occasions.
This previous experience led her to believe the suitcase would
contain no more than 400 grams of heroin. The court imposed
a sentence based on the quantity the defendant had expected
to possess,103 noting that she "was no more than an obedient
underling" in her boyfriend's narcotics operation. 4
The court held that it was "essential" to require foresee-
ability for quantity-based sentences under either the mandato-
ry-minimum statutes or the Guidelines."5 In justifying its
apparent departure from Second Circuit precedent, the
Ekwunoh court observed that the Circuit's position on mens
rea was of "doubtful constitutionality,"' but the court did
not base its opinion on constitutional grounds.
Indeed, the legal grounding for the court's opinion was
somewhat unclear. The court provided an exposition of the
historical importance of mens rea and the real world protection
it offered unwitting offenders from unfairly severe sentences.
The court concluded that dispensing with mens rea for quanti-
ty would involve an "erosion of a fundamental protection of our
Anglo-American system of criminal justice," which Congress
could not have intended. As additional precedent, the Ekwunoh
court cited the "foreseeability" requirement that the Sentencing
Guidelines specify as the mens rea for conspiracy offenses. The
court held that the Guidelines' mens rea requirements should
apply to the mandatory-minimum quantity-based statutes for
possession. The court did not clarify, however, exactly why a
mens rea requirement for conspiracy should apply to a posses-
sion offense.' 7
The Ekwunoh court's decision on the defendant's culpabili-
ty was clearly influenced by her relatively peripheral role in
the narcotics enterprise. Among the court's paramount con-
cerns was the protection mens rea offers to individuals of limit-
ed culpability. In furtherance of that end, the court proposed a
"foreseeability" test for quantity as a sentencing factor under
which an individual's position in the narcotics enterprise plays
103 Id. at 179-80.
o'Id.
" Id. at 178-80.
106 Id. at 171.
, Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at 174-75.
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an operative role. For defendants with a minor role, the quan-
tity imputed would be the lesser of what the defendant actual-
ly possessed or what he reasonably believed he possessed.
Actual quantity would determine the sentence of any other
defendant, including one who was willfully blind to the quanti-
ty of drugs in her possession, one who had no limiting belief as
to quantity, and one who was a "central or directing force" in
the narcotics enterpriselos
When Ekwunoh reached the Second Circuit, the court
looked skeptically on Judge Weinstein's proposal to employ a
foreseeability standard but reserved decision on the issue.""
Instead, the court reversed on the ground that the lower court
had made a clearly erroneous ruling, by determining that the
defendant could not have foreseen the quantity of drugs she
possessed."' 0
Meanwhile, in another case, Judge Weinstein continued to
insist on the importance of mens rea in determining penalties.
In United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie,"' two Colombian de-
fendants had separately smuggled a quantity of heroin into the
United States, each believing the substance to be cocaine. As
recounted in the court's opinion, the defendants were persons
of minimal sophistication and education, who served the nar-
cotics enterprise in the lowly position of "drug mule." Thus, the
court found their mistake of fact to be credible and calculated
their penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines for cocaine
possession."
The Cordoba-Hincapie court held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that defendants know the nature of the controlled
substance in their possession. But the defendant can challenge
this presumption at sentencing. As in Ekwunoh, the Cordoba-
Hincapie court obliquely acknowledged that this position was
contrary to Second Circuit precedent. The court partly justified
its departure from precedent by distinguishing the facts of
Cordoba-Hincapie from the Second Circuit cases. It went on to
observe, however, that in the previous holdings, the Second
Circuit had dismissed "the importance of the mens rea princi-
' Id. at 174.
'0' United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.2d 368, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1993).
Uo Id.




ple without considering the integral role that principle plays in
the rational operation of a carefully constructed criminal code
that has deterrence as a primary objective."
13
The most unusual aspect of Cordoba-Hincapie was that
the court endeavored to find a constitutional grounding for the
mens rea principle. The court stated that due process implicitly
requires proof of mens rea. As support, it pointed to the long
legal and political history of culpability requirements. It fur-
ther noted that the requirement is a matter of "fundamental
fairness," a chief concern of due process. The court acknowl-
edged that the Supreme Court has upheld the strict liability of
enforcement of certain crimes, but asserted that this does not
preclude a constitutional grounding for some form of mens rea
requirement. According to the court, the extent of culpability
required should be determined by factors such as the nature of
the crime and the penalty imposed."'
Additionally, the Cordoba-Hincapie court rejected the
Second Circuit's position that a defendant's mental state was
relevant only to conviction and not to sentencing. It stated, to
the contrary, that culpability was uniquely critical under the
"complex penalty hierarchy" of the narcotics statutes and the
Sentencing Guidelines. The court observed that "it is not pru-
dent to construct an elaborate ladder of punishment and then
automatically bump defendants up that ladder without regard
to their mental states." Mistakes of fact, the court noted, are
"equally relevant in applying the criminal law to the guilty as
to the innocent."" 5
The Second Circuit did not adopt the tests suggested in
Cordoba-Hincapie and Ekwunoh. In United States v.
Imariagbe"6 the court precluded a defendant from using lack
of knowledge as an affirmative defense in a drug possession
case. In this case, the defendant offered "credible" testimony
that he did not know the amount of heroin he possessed. Yet,
the court held this to be irrelevant to the punishment phase of
trial, and imposed a sentence based on the quantity actually
possessed."
u3 Id. at 531.
" Id. at 515-18.
u6 Id. at 533.
n" 999 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1993).
,U Id. at 707-08.
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In another case, the Second Circuit took a further step
toward applying a pure strict liability standard at sentencing.
Ekwunoh had left open the question of whether a "foreseeabili-
ty" standard should be applied to a defendant's knowledge of
quantity. In United States v. de Velasquez,1 the court ex-
pressly rejected that notion. The court held that "as a general
proposition, a defendant may be sentenced for the entire quan-
tity of drugs in his possession even if the total quantity was
not foreseeable.""
The defendant in de Velasquez had been convicted for
smuggling heroin into the country. After her arrest at the
airport, customs agents determined that she was carrying
heroin in her stomach and in her shoes. The woman admitted
knowledge of the heroin she had swallowed but claimed she
was unaware and could not have reasonably foreseen the addi-
tional heroin she carried in her shoesYw
The court held that under the Guidelines the sentence
should be determined by the total quantity of heroin she car-
ried, even if that amount was unforeseeable."' The court rea-
soned that once a defendant "knowingly traffics in drugs," he
bears the risk "that his conduct may be more harmful to soci-
ety than he intends or foresees." Thus, it held that courts
should disregard a defendant's "fortuitous lack of knowledge or
foreseeability-fortuities which apparently occur with some
frequency."=
Despite the sternness of this language, the de Velasquez
court did qualify its strict liability rule to make a small allow-
ance for a mistake of fact. The court stated that strict liability
should be applied in the "ordinary mine-run case," but added
that in an unusual situation, the defendant's belief might be so
far removed from actuality that sentencing for actual quantity
would be "grossly unfair."' The court observed that "a fertile
U 28 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1994).
"' Id. at 3.
120 Id.
121 The court cited a section of Sentencing Guidelines commentary which pro-
vides that drug couriers should be sentenced without regard to the reasonable
foreseeability of the quantity of drugs possessed. Id. at 5.
" Id. at 6.
de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 6 (quoting United States v. Imariagbe, 999 F.2d
706, 708 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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imagination can conjure bizarre situations where the
defendant's possession is tenuous and fleeting."24 In such a
case, a downward departure under the Guidelines would be ap-
propriate." The court did not further define the distinctions
between an "extraordinary case" and an "ordinary mine-run"
case.
126
II. BACKGROUND OF MENS REA FOR NARcOTICS CASES IN NEW
YORK STATE
Like the federal enhanced-penalty provisions, New York
State drug laws mandate specified penalties based on the na-
ture and quantity of the controlled substance a defendant pos-
sessed. The element of quantity acts to divide the substantive
offense into seven degrees or grades of increasing seriousness.
Defendants who possess a minimum amount of a controlled
narcotic are guilty of seventh degree possession, those who
posses the maximum specified amount are guilty of first degree
possession. The statute requires the imposition of penalties of
increasing severity for each degree of offense. The statute is
divided into similar degrees and penalties based on the nature
of the substance possessed.
The New York narcotics statute specifies a "knowing"
,, Id. at 5.
' Such a discretionary downward departure would presumably only be possible
when the defendant was sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the
mandatory minimums, which do not permit judicial discretion, the judge would be
obligated to impose the minimum quantity-based sentence, even when victim of an
extraordinary mistake of fact. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
"' de Velazquez, 28 F.3d at 6. It is unclear to what extent-if any-the Second
Circuit's allowance for the "extraordinary case" will mitigate the general strict
liability rule. A district court case, United States v. Coates, 739 F. Supp. 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), involving the school-yard enhanced-penalty statute, is perhaps
illustrative of the extreme situation contemplated by the court in de Velasquez. In
Coates, the police caught the defendants in possession of cocaine while the defen-
dants were waiting for departure aboard an Amtrak train at Penn Station in New
York City. Prosecutors sought to impose an additional penalty under the school-
yard statute, because the train awaiting departure was located less than 1,000 feet
way from the Taylor Business school, an adult vocational facility. Calling this
"simple overreaching" and "beyond logical and acceptable bounds," the court re-
fused to apply the statute. Id. at 153. The court suggested the importance of mens
rea, calling the defendant's presence near the school "undoubtedly unknowing." Id.
The court did not suggest guidelines for a proper application of the statute beyond
noting the absurdity of its use in the given circumstances.
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culpability level. By the time People v. Ryan was decided, it
was well-established that this mens rea extended to both
knowledge of possession and, unlike in the federal courts,
knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed. Prosecu-
tors may establish knowledge simply by proving possession
itself, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of knowl-
edge.' The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a
defendant's mistake of fact.'
While the Court of Appeals had never directly addressed
the mens rea requirement for the element of weight before
Ryan,M a 1980 case appeared to indicate that a defendant's
knowledge of weight was an element to be considered at sen-
tencing. In People v. Scarborough,1" the defendant had
claimed that prosecutors had not proven her knowledge of
either the nature or weight of the controlled substance. With-
out elaborating on the issue, the court concluded that the
prosecutors had met their burden."
I People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 277 NE.2d 396, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1971).
This case held that while the statute required proof that the defendant's "knowing-
If possessed the controlled substance, the defendant's actual possession created a
rebuttable presumption of this knowledge. The court held that this proposition
followed from the "ancient rule" that possession of the "fruits of any crime" creates
an inference of guilt. Id. at 285, 277 N.E.2d at 400, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 348. The
court noted that this inference was particularly well.suited to narcotics offenses,
because controlled substances are valuable and the trade in narcotics is conducted
"with the utmost secrecy and care". Id. at 287, 277 N.E.24 at 401, 327 N.YS.2d
at 349.
" People v. Tramuta, 109 A.D.2d 765, 486 N.Y.S.2d 82 (2d Dep't 1985). Here,
the defendant was convicted of sale and possession of LSD to undercover officers.
However, throughout a protracted series of negotiations and at the actual sale,
both the defendant and the officers referred to the drug as mescaline. After the
defendant's arrest, it turned out that the substance was in fact not mescaline but
LSD. Although the terms mescaline and LSD are often used interchangeably, and
actual mescaline is rarely available in New York, evidence showed the defendant
was unaware of these facts. Based on this lack of knowledge, the court upheld the
conviction and the sentence for the lesser charge of sale and possession of mesca-
line. Id. at 767-68, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 83-84.
1 A 1978 trial court decision denied the defendant's motion to reduce charges
based on his lack of knowledge of weight. The court stated that the evidentiary
difficulties of establishing knowledge of weight precluded requiring a mens rea for
this element People v. Davis, 95 Misc.2d 1010, 408 N.YS.2d 748 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1978).
0' 49 N.Y.2d 364, 402 N.E.2d 1127, 426 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1930).
-1 Id. at 374, 402 NYE.2d at 1133, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 230. This is indicative of
the then "prevailing view of the law" that knowledge of quantity was not an ele-
ment of a narcotics offense. Prosecutors and trial courts both acted on this as-
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III. PEOPLE V. RYAN
A. Facts and Procedural History
The defendant, Robert Ryan, placed an order for hallucino-
genic mushrooms with his friend, Hopkins. Hopkins proceeded
to order the mushrooms---"in the usual shipment"-from a
mutual friend in San Francisco, who then sent the mushrooms
to New York.'32 The police in New York had been tipped off
to the transaction and intercepted the package. An investiga-
tor, disguised as a Federal Express employee, delivered the
package to Hopkins. Upon accepting the package, Hopkins was
arrested."S
Hopkins thereupon decided to help the police inculpate his
friend Ryan, who was still awaiting his order of mushrooms.
Hopkins phoned Ryan to tell him that the shipment had ar-
rived."$ During this call, Hopkins made two references to
weight: he first told Ryan that the shipment contained "a shit
load of mushrooms" to which Ryan responded, "I know." Subse-
quently, Hopkins indicated that the shipment contained about
two pounds of mushrooms." After this conversation,
Hopkins delivered a substitute package to Ryan. Thinking it
contained his mushrooms, Ryan accepted the package. Police
officers then arrested Ryan.3 '
Ryan was charged with attempted second-degree posses-
sion of a controlled substance."' At trial, the prosecution es-
sumption. People v. Crooks, 160 Misc.2d 813, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1994). See also People v. Quinones, 161 Misc.2d 901, 905, 615 N.Y.S.2d
630, 632 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994) ("Although the Ryan issue may havo
been ripe for litigation in this case and countless others, the fact remains that no
one thought of it in some twenty years, including the framers of the pattern jury
instructions."). In the dozen years between Scarborough and Ryan, the reported
cases indicate that knowledge of quantity was not an issue at the appellate level.
12 People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 498-99, 626 N.E.2d 51, 53.54, 605 N.Y.S.2d
235, 236.37 (1994). The hallucinogenic ingredient in hallucinogenic mushrooms is





" A felony which requires possession of at least 625 milligrams of an halluci-
nogen. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18(5) (McKinney 1989). Ryan also faced a lesser-
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tablished that the package Ryan ordered contained a quantity
of hallucinogen above the statutory threshold. The prosecution
did not establish a definition of the typical amount of psilocy-
bin for hallucinogenic mushrooms.' At the close of trial, the
court denied Ryan's motion to dismiss, which he made on the
grounds that prosecutors did not prove knowledge of quanti-
ty."5 9 Ryan was convicted of second-degree attempted posses-
sion of a controlled substance.14 The Third Department de-
nied Ryan's appeal, on the grounds that the specified mens rea
"knowingly" modified possession itself and not the quantity
possessed. 41
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals began by noting that the knowledge
requirement had long applied to the nature of the controlled
substance.' Because the nature of the substance (in this
case, an hallucinogen) is specified after the weight require-
ment, the court reasoned that "knowingly" must also apply to
weight.' The court concluded, in fact, that this was the obvi-
ous meaning of the statute.'"
The court next examined this conclusion according to two
rules of statutory construction found in the New York Penal
Law. First, the court observed that the rule which precludes
the imposition of strict liability in the absence of express statu-
tory language mandated a mens rea requirement for
weight.' The court then applied the Penal Law rule which
included charge of seventh-degree possession, a misdemeanor with no minimum
weight requirement. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 626 N.E.2d at 53-54, 205 N.YS.2d
at 236-37.
13 It also did not establish whether psilocybin occurs naturally in a variety of
mushroom or is added. Id.
People v. Ryan, 184 AJ).2d 24, 25, 591 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (3d Dep't 1992).
140 The court sentenced him to ten years to life imprisonment, a ventence partly
determined by Ryan's second-offender status. Id.
141 Id. at 25, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
2 Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 501, 626 N9.2d at 54, 605 N.YS.2d at 238 The relevant
portion of the penal law states: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully posse3s-
es 5.625 milligrams of a hallucinogen." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18(5).





mandates that the culpability level specified in a statute pre-
sumptively applies to every element of the crime, absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary. The court concluded that the
mens rea "knowingly" specified by the statute at issue in Ryan
presumptively applied to the element of weight, because there
was no evidence of legislative intent to the contrary.
The court observed that its holding was consistent with
basic ideas of fairness and proportionality. It stated that to
subject a defendant to "drastic differences" in potential penal-
ties based upon quantity without culpability distinctions based
on mental state "would be inconsistent with notions of individ-
ual responsibility and proportionality prevailing in the penal
law."46 The court further observed that a defendant who is
unaware of the quantity of drugs he possesses is "not deserving
of enhanced punishment [linked to that quantity]." 47
The court next suggested several evidentiary guidelines for
proving knowledge of quantity. In aggregate-weight cases,
prosecutors could establish an inference of knowledge through
evidence of the negotiations surrounding a drug sale or thor-
ough evidence showing that the defendant 'handled" the con-
trolled substance.'48 The court acknowledged the greater evi-
dentiary hurdles with pure weight cases, but suggested these
could be solved through either evidence showing the typical
weight per dose, or evidence showing the defendant knew he
had a typical dose.'
The court concluded that prosecutors had not shown
Ryan's knowledge of the weight of the psilocybin, a controlled
substance measured according to its pure weight."' Although
there was evidence that he knew of the two pound aggregate
weight of the mushrooms, this was insufficient for a pure
weight offense. 5' For an inference of knowledge, the court
needed evidence establishing the "typical" amount of psilocybin
in a dose of mushrooms and establishing how psilocybin gets
into mushrooms. 52 Thus, the court reduced the charges
"' Id. at 502-03, 626 N.E.2d at 51-52, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 238-39; see N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 1989).
" Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 503-05, 626 N.E.2d at 52-53, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 239-41.
I" d.
1' Id. at 505-06, 626 N.E.2d at 53-54, 60 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42.
160 Id.
161 Id.
12 In other words, whether it grows naturally or is injected. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d
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against Ryan from second degree attempted possession, to
seventh degree attempted possession, for which there is no
weight threshold.
C. Analysis
The Court of Appeals' holding in People v. Ryan is consis-
tent with the long-established rule making proof of mental
culpability for each element of a crime a prerequisite to crimi-
nal conviction and punishment. Moreover, the narcotics statute
at issue in Ryan is intrinsically different from the social-wel-
fare and regulatory-offense statutes which represent the chief
exception to this general rule. Unlike social-welfare offenses,
the penal statute in Ryan targets persons engaged in a purely
criminal activity; it carries serious penalties, ranging up to life
imprisonment. Dispensing with culpability requirements for
conviction under this statute would be a rare and unwarranted
expansion of strict criminal liability.'
1. Narcotics Offense Statutes Fall Outside the Established
Use of Strict Criminal Liability
Narcotics offense statutes serve a different purpose than
social-welfare statutes or regulatory criminal statutes. Narcot-
ics statutes seek not to control but to eliminate a criminal
activity: the use and sale of substances which the legislature
has determined pose a danger to society. Traditional strict
liability crimes regulate certain industries which, though po-
tentially hazardous, provide important benefits to society.
Early narcotics offense statutes were also regulatory, but with
the increase in society's alarm over the nation's escalating
drug problem, the purpose of anti-drug legislation has under-
at 500, 626 N.E.2d at 49, 605 N.Y.S.2d 237.
u3 New York prosecutors, in their efforts to induce the legislature to override
Ryan, mischaracterize the holding as a departure from standard rules, ignoring the
long-standing links between mens rea and severity of puniobmont. See Gary
Spencer, Ryan Ruling Held Retroactive, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 17, 1995, 1, 8 (Prosscutors
arguing against retroactive application of Ryan characterize the holding as a 'dra-
matie shift away from customary and established law ...."); Gryta, cupra note 9
(Kevin Dillon, President of the New York State District Attorneys Association,
calls Ryan an "unprecedented departure," while arguing the holding is 'devastating
to enforcement of the state's drug laws . .. ').
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gone a corresponding change. The purpose of criminalizing
drug use is no longer a matter of convenience or promoting
social efficiency. Contemporary narcotics legislation is designed
primarily to punish and deter persons engaged in what has
been deemed a purely destructive criminal activity.'
This legislative intent corresponds to a general social per-
ception that the sale and use of controlled substances repre-
sent grave, intrinsic wrongs. The criminal nature of drug crime
now exists independently of legislative initiative. It has become
akin to traditional common law offenses such as murder, rob-
bery, rape and arson. Like these more traditional offenses, it
sparks in society a sense of outrage and the desire for retribu-
tion. The depth of this feeling can be gauged by the scorn and
alarm which frequently greet proposals to legalize or decrimi-
nalize certain kinds of drug use. Indeed, despite the lack of a
clear antecedent in the common law, drug crime can now be
fairly categorized as a mala in se offense.
The imposition of strict liability for offenses is inappropri-
ate, given the intrinsically criminal nature of drug offenses.
Strict liability has rarely been applied to such purely criminal
activities. This is partly because of the very opprobrium with
which society responds to such activity. It is unfair to impose
such a high degree of infamy upon a person who unwittingly
committed a bad act.
Additionally, the characteristics which tend to mitigate the
harshness of certain strict liability crimes are not present in
narcotics offenses. One reason strict liability is palatable for a
social-welfare offense is that liability is imposed on those in a
responsible relation to the harm caused. These individuals are
typically business persons whose position affords them a large
measure of knowledge and authority. By knowingly accepting
the great power of their positions, such persons must also
accept the special risks and burdens of a strict liability regime.
A heightened duty to protect the public is a reasonable ex-
change for the privileges of their position. It would, however,
be pointless and deeply inequitable to extend strict liability to
the secretaries, stock-clerks and other low-level employees of a
"' See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 497 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (discussing the transformation of narcotics statutes into largely punitive
offenses, as social perceptions about the acceptability of drug use have changed).
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business engaged in harmful acts-even though such persons
may, in the course of their employment, unwittingly contribute
to the harm caused. Thus, the traditional strict liability crime
is properly limited to those persons who, because of the power
of their positions, must bear an unusually high responsibility
to society.
By contrast, narcotics offense statutes must maintain the
traditional culpability requirements because these statutes
target persons at all levels of the criminal organization. Crimi-
nals working at the lowest levels of the drug trade-such as
couriers and facilitators-may be persons of limited sophistica-
tion and knowledge. Through exploitation by their superiors in
the drug trade, persons knowingly engaged in minor narcotics
crime may unwittingly commit far more serious bad acts, car-
rying much harsher penalties. Because such persons function
in roles bereft of special power or knowledge, it would be un-
fair to impose an additional punishment for these acts. Society
may rationally punish such low-level drug criminals only for
those harmful acts committed with knowledge, as evidenced by
the traditional mens rea requirement.
Additionally, a strict liability regime for drug crime would
be particularly harsh on the unwitting offender because of the
potentially severe penalties these offenses carry. Society should
tolerate strict liability only for those offenses where punish-
ment is not the prime means of correcting or preventing harm.
Punishment is at the heart of the narcotics offense, functioning
as both deterrent and retribution. Indeed, legislators generally
respond to escalating levels of drug crime by increasing penal-
ties. Thus, drug defendants commonly face mandatory prison
terms of ten or twenty years in both state and federal courts.
Applying this level of penalty on a strict liability basis is an
unjustified and virtually unprecedented departure from the
principal that punishment requires proof of mental culpability.
Applying traditional culpability requirements for each
material element of a narcotics crime ensures that a drug
criminal's punishment reflects his true measure of guilt. Mens
rea provides an accurate gauge of the drug criminal's fitness
for punishment-as it does for the killer, the hoodlum and the
thief. It remains the fairest and most reliable means for society
to determine the degree of responsibility such criminals must
bear for their acts and gives courts a rational way to determine
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severity of punishment. Thus, the Ryan rule does not exculpate
drug criminals of limited culpability. Instead, it ensures that
each drug criminal incurs a level of blame and punishment
that is tailored to his or her actual responsibility for the harm
caused.
2. Social Concerns Do Not Justify Extending Strict
Liability to Narcotics Crimes
Rising levels of drug crime and attendant social ills do not
warrant a departure from the rule requiring proof of mens rea
prior to punishment and conviction. Strict liability is unlikely
to curb drug crime because it will not deter those criminals
most responsible for the increase in such crime. The powerful
and sophisticated drug dealers who pose the greatest menace
to society will have little reason to alter their activities just
because courts institute strict liability for enhanced penalties.
The greatest deterrent effect of strict liability is that defen-
dants are unable to escape enhanced penalties by feigning a
lack of awareness. It is difficult, however, for the powerful
drug dealer to feign unawareness or lack of intent, because
evidence of the scope and complexity of his operation creates
an inference of knowledge. Moreover, the profits and power
derived from continuing his criminal activities will substantial-
ly outweigh a marginally increased risk of receiving an en-
hanced punishment.
Strict liability applied to enhanced penalties may, to a
small extent, deter lower-level drug criminals. If a person pe-
ripherally involved in the drug trade knows that courts will
punish him for his actions, regardless of mistake or accident,
he may choose not to risk further crime. The risk of receiving a
long prison term may outweigh the meager benefits of a limit-
ed involvement in the drug trade. However deterring an occa-
sional or peripheral drug criminal will have minimal impact on
serious narcotics crime because these criminals play a small
role in the narcotics operation. Even this small deterrence
value impacts only those low-level criminals who know that
the courts apply strict liability. Additionally, the low-level
criminal's involvement with narcotics may arise from desperate
circumstances, such as poverty or a sudden financial crisis, in
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which case the deterrent impact is lost.
Moreover, any deterrent effect of strict liability will always
be limited by the extent drug traffickers are able to offer their
underlings additional compensation for the increased risk of
enhanced punishment. The lure of a greater profit share would
ensure a steady supply of persons willing to perform essential
low-level functions, despite the additional hazards of strict
liability. Those persons who remained deterred by the in-
creased risk would likely be those least committed to drug
crime and of minimal value to the criminal enterprise. In this
way, the net deterrent effect of strict liability might cause an
increased professionalization of the narcotics enterprise rather
than a significant disruption in operation.
While the deterrent benefits are unclear, the injustice of
strict liability is predictable. This injustice will fall
disproportionately upon those on the outskirts of the drug
trade. Of all drug criminals, these persons are the most likely
to fall victim to a mistake of fact or accident and be punished
under a strict liability regime. It is easy to imagine how a
cunning and manipulative drug dealer could deceive an under-
ling about the true nature or quantity of a controlled sub-
stance. A friend or neighbor of a drug dealer might agree to
store a controlled substance only because she believes it to be
cocaine, when in fact it is crack cocaine or heroin. Similarly, an
...... L r~hed nergon mi-ht. for nocket change, aeree to carry a
t of heroin, when in fact it contains a sufficient quantity
ect him to a twenty-year prison term.
. requiring knowledge of quantity, the Ryan holding
3 that such persons of limited culpability are protected
n unjust and disproportionate sentence.' At the same
hese persons will still face conviction and punishment
is perhaps difficult to see Robert Ryan as a person of limited culpability
the facts, as presented by the court, suggest he had some knowledge of
Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 626 N.2d at 653-54, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 236-
xi, in simple contract terms, hacl the sale been consummated, Ryan would
eived what he bargained, for-two pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms.
stablishing a "typical" weight for psilocybin. Id. at 502, 626 NE.2d at
Y.S.2d at 238. Importantly, with proper preparation and presentation of




for crimes committed knowingly. Thus, while Ryan maintains
the important protective power of the mens rea requirement, it
does not diminish the deterrent and retributive impact of drug
laws. Moreover, Ryan does not create an unusual or unprece-
dented new burden for prosecutors. Establishing mens rea has
long been the prosecutor's task. Proving knowledge of quantity
is not any more onerous a burden than proving knowledge for
possession of stolen goods or for assaulting an officer. As with
these roughly analogous crimes, difficulties of proof can be
solved through inferences and presumptions. While this task
poses certain administrative and labor burdens on prosecutors
and the court system, these demands have long been accepted
as a necessary part of a fair justice system.
Beyond this administrative burden, the Ryan holding will
have only a small impact on the prosecution and conviction of
drug criminals. Use of the evidentiary tools suggested in the
court's opinion will largely ensure that criminals do not escape
punishment for the crimes for which they are culpable. Indeed
for drug sale cases, which pose the greatest social danger,
proof of knowledge of weight can easily be inferred from evi-
dence of negotiations or possession of weighing tools." In
possession cases, evidence that the defendant handled the
controlled substance may create an inference of knowledge.
This may be particularly true if the substance weighs signifi-
cantly more than the statutory threshold. Thus, a defendant
who possesses so-called "dealership" quantities will not escape
full punishment. Where the defendant possesses only slightly
above the threshold, he still faces a jail term according to the
next highest degree of the crime. 57
" In its first post-Ryan holding on the issue, the Court of Appeals held that
evidence arising from a heroin sale-particularly evidence that the defendant nego-
tiated a weight-based purchase price-could create an inference that the defendant
knew the weight of the heroin. People v. Hill, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17, 1995, at 27. Evi-
dence of this sort is readily available in the large majority of prosecutions involv-
ing drug dealers. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 1. As Judge Fisher points out,
Ryan may actually prove to be a boon to prosecutors because, following the stan-
dard rule of evidence, evidence of past narcotics crime and misconduct may be
introduced to counter a defendant's claimed mistake of fact as to quantity.
Although the holding in Hill confirms that Ryan will not result in lower pen-
alties in cases involving a drug transaction, law enforcement officials redoubled
their efforts to pass legislation eliminating the requirement. Spencer, supra note
153, at 8 (Manhattan D.A. announces that eliminating Ryan remained "our top
legislative priority.").
"" Lower courts are split as to what evidence of "handling" is sufficient to
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3. Proof of a Defendant's Threshold Mens Rea Does Not
Justify Imposing an Enhanced Penalty
The Ryan holding is significant because the court chose
not to apply the threshold mens rea doctrine which is now
routinely used in federal enhanced-penalty cases. The Ryan
holding is directly contrary to the federal notion that a mens
rea indicating a threshold level of criminal or antisocial culpa-
bility fairly may subject a defendant to a range of penalties. By
contrast, the New York Court of Appeals hewed to the tradi-
tional notion that proportionality demands proof of mens rea
for an element that determines penalty.
The federal enhanced-penalty cases divorce mens rea from
its historic role of justifying the imposition of punishment.
Punishment is legitimate and meaningful only when its severi-
ty is linked to the culpable mental state of the defendant. The
law historically reserves its greatest penalties for those who
act with a high level of awareness. For instance, a person who
kills with minimal awareness of his action faces a moderate
penalty; but a person who kills with intent is more blamewor-
thy and is, therefore, subject to a long prison term or death. By
contrast, in the federal narcotics cases applying enhanced
penalties, the same level of awareness may justify either a
moderate penalty or life imprisonment.
Penalty distinctions, such as those created by the manda-
tory-minimum statutes and Sentencing Guidelines become
meaningless if courts impose them without reference to per-
sonal culpability. There is no logic or value to mandating an
enhanced penalty for possession of a greater quantity of nar-
create an inference of knowledge and this issue is pending in the Court of Ap-
peals. Anderson, supra note 13, at 1. Additionally, judicial attention has thus far
been focused on the retroactivity of the holding, which has precluded a full dis-us-
sion of the evidentiary issues. Despite this uncertainty, however, it seems clear
that evidence of handling, combined with some evidence of the defendant'o famil-
iarity with the drug, creates a sufficient inference of knowledge of quantity. See
People v. Okehoffurum, 201 A.D.2d 508, 607 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2d Dep't 1994) (evi-
dence that the defendant carried a briefcase containing heroin for which he expect-
ed to receive three to five thousand dollars satisfied the mens rea requirement for
quantity); People v. Sanchez, 205 A.D.2d 472, 613 N.Y.S.2d 912 (lot Dop't 1994)
(insufficient to show that the defendant simply "held! the controlled substance,
without other evidence indicating his familiarity with narcotics).
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cotics if all those who possess any quantity are equally guilty.
Without culpability distinctions, quantity becomes a kind of
happenstance-a lottery which determines whether a particu-
lar defendant spends a year in prison or a lifetime. If legisla-
tures wish to create a single mens rea for a particular drug
crime, then they must abolish enhanced penalties based on
particularly harmful forms of that crime.
The underlying assumption of threshold mens rea is that
the only real culpability distinction is between a good person
and a bad person. This is an archaic notion with little rele-
vance to the complexities of contemporary narcotics crime.
Narcotics crime is a broad field, encompassing a wide range of
activities which people undertake with varying levels of intent,
awareness and motive. There is an atavistic appeal to the idea
that anyone who engages in narcotics crime deserves whatever
punishments he gets; the legislature and courts should resist
the lure of this kind of stark morality because it ignores basic
culpability distinctions among those engaged in drug crime.
The legal and moral importance of determining relative
blameworthiness must extend even to those already engaged in
criminal activity in order to correspond to society's intuitive
need to determine who is more deserving of blame and punish-
ment. The proper gauge of relative culpability is a person's
state of mind. For example, anyone who deals drugs near a
school knowingly engages in a bad act, whether or not he is
aware of the school. But a person who chooses to deal drugs in
front of a clearly labeled elementary school deserves a greater
share of blame and punishment than a dealer who is unaware
of a school's proximity. This is not necessarily because of a
difference in motive-indeed both persons may be equally
indifferent to the school's proximity. However, the dealer with
awareness had the opportunity to exercise moral judgment by
moving away from the school and chose not to exercise it; he is
thus more culpable than the dealer without awareness.
Under threshold mens rea, the law becomes oblivious to
this basic distinction. Because it no longer has a mechanism to
determine relative blameworthiness, severity of punishment is
not calculated according to blame. The law becomes removed
from a fundamental and widely shared collective understand-
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ing about the nature of guilt and the purpose of punish-
ment.se
Adopting a system of threshold mens rea, on the other
hand, has societal as well as moral repercussions. It is in
society's interest to encourage criminals to become less crimi-
nal. To this end, the law must provide drug criminals with a
personal interest in avoiding the most destructive forms of
narcotics crime such as dealing very dangerous drugs, and
dealing to a minor or near a school. Maintaining culpability
distinctions promotes this goal because criminals know that
the law will only punish them for those bad acts committed
with awareness. Under threshold mens rea, a criminal knows
he will be punished for both those bad acts done knowingly
and those done by mistake. He has less cause to exercise self-
control and plan his activities to inflict the least damage on
society. This in turn will encourage increased recklessness and
disregard of consequence among drug criminals."'
4. The Ryan Mens Rea Requirement Has a Constitutional
Basis
The concern with fairness and proportionality which un-
derlies the mens rea requirement indicates that the Ryan hold-
ing can be based on constitutional grounds. Due process man-
dates a mens rea requirement for all mala in se crimes because
mens rea provides persons of limited culpability with critical
protection from an unwarranted deprivation of personal liber-
ty. However, courts rarely elucidate specific due process limits
on strict liability criminal prosecution (although they often
I' The federal courts hold that the drug offender "bears the burden that his
conduct will be more harmful than intended. See supra, note 95 and accompanying
text. But, as a commentator observes about this concept as it relates to felony
murder, "the principle that the wrongdoer must run the rish explicitly obscures
the question of actual responsibility for the harmful result." George P. Fletcher,
Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 SW. UNIV. L. REV. 413, 428 (1980).
"' This principle is properly understood not just as using self-interest to deter
the drug offender from more serious narcotics offenses, but as an incentive to
internalize the moral and social values underlying the enhanced penalty provision.
See, e.g., Saltzman, supra note 38, at 1587, on the moralizing effect of a culpabili-
ty requirement. ("Some behavioral scientists have suggested that some human
behavior can be explained in terms of an internal scale of moral judgment which




point to concerns of fairness and proportionality as being at
the heart of the mens rea requirement). This is because the
courts' primary function in mens rea cases has been to discern
the legislative intent behind ambiguous penal statutes. The
Ryan court's presentation of its holding as the product of pure
statutory interpretation is consistent with this approach.
Statutory interpretation no longer provides sufficient
grounds for insuring that proof of culpability remains a re-
quirement of narcotics offense prosecutions. Statutory interpre-
tation only protects defendants against over-zealous prosecu-
tors who seek to create strict liability offenses from ambiguous
statutes. In the volatile political climate surrounding narcotics
crime, it is increasingly legislatures that may demand strict
liability prosecution of these offenses. 6 ' Without a constitu-
tional basis, the legislature is free to mandate strict liability
even for common-law crimes carrying severe penalties. The
fundamental protections of mens rea will be readily sacrificed
to accommodate political demands for a swifter and sterner
criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not elucidat-
ed a clear constitutional ground which could be used to anchor
the Ryan holding. In fact, the Court has thus far defined few
constitutional limits to the use of strict liability.161 However,
due process does prohibit the strict liability enforcement of a
statute which penalizes a failure to act when the defendant
1 0 This is exemplified by the swift and negative response of legislators and
prosecutors to the Ryan holding. Weeks after the decision, legislators introduced
competing bills to eliminate the holding. N.Y.A.B. 9119 (Jan. 18, 1994); N.Y.S.B.
6632 (Feb. 7, 1994); N.Y.A.B. 9490 (Feb. 17, 1994) (all proposing to expressly
amend the Penal Law to preclude a mens rea requirement for knowledge of quan-
tity); N.Y.SJB. S6912 (March 7, 1994). Republican legislators and Governor Mario
Cuomo were unable to pass this legislation only because Democrats, wishing to
provide some level of protection to low-level drug couriers, favored a statutory
rebuttable presumption of knowledge.
"I Morissette is perhaps the Court's most forceful and oft-quoted expression of
the equitable concerns underlying the mens rea rule. Yet the holding is grounded
on interpretation of an ambiguous statute and does not create a constitutional
ground for a scienter requirement. Almost as an afterthought, the Court notes that
it would be obligated to enforce the statute had the legislature expressly dispensed
with scienter. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 246 (1952). See also
Liparotta v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1985) (Court construes a culpa-
bility requirement in an ambiguous statute in order to avoid "criminalizing other-
wise innocent conduct," while observing that a contrary conclusion would not cre-
ate a constitutional problem).
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was not "on notice" of the duty." This suggests that due pro-
cess may also require proof of a defendant's knowledge of each
substantive element of a crime."s
Moreover, a due process ground for Ryan would be consis-
tent with previous statements of New York courts regarding
constitutional limits on strict liability. Strict liability is uncon-
stitutional in New York wherever its application would "shock
a sense of fair play."" Courts have not defined the scope of
this constitutional limit to strict liability. However, it is logical
that severity of punishment should be a determinative factor.
Indeed, one New York court has stated that strict liability
enforcement of a penal statute carrying a penalty of up to six
months in jail would violate due process." Thus, New York
courts apply strict liability to social-welfare offenses only be-
cause they are essentially regulatory and not punitive in na-
ture.
The quantity-based New York drug laws are highly puni-
, 2 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
The Court has defined an eighth amendment ground for a culpability re-
quirement in capital crimes. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 800 (1931), the
Court refused, on eighth amendment grounds, to enforce a death sentence for a
defendant convicted of felony murder. The Court observed that the retributive
value of such a sentence "very much depends on the degree of [the
defendant's] . . . culpability-what [his] intentions, expectations, and actions were."
In dissent, Justice O'Connor noted disapprovingly that the holding was "especially
disturbing because it makes intent a matter of federal constitutional law ... .
Id. at 824. Because the Court is reluctant to apply eighth amendment protection
to non-capital offenses, the felony murder doctrine remains intact. Nevertheless,
given the conceptual similarity between threshold mens rea and felony murder,
Ennund appears to raise the theoretical possibility of an eighth amendment ban
on enforcing particularly harsh quantity-based penalties on a threshold mens rea
basis. For a discussion of the Eighth Amendment as it relates to felony murder,
see Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 472-85 (1985).
People v. Colozzo, 54 Misc.2d 687, 691, 283 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1967). While New York courts have not defined how due process limits
strict liability, cases suggest that these limits exist. See id. (stating that due pro-
cess will limit the state's power to create a strict liability offens); People v.
Northrop, 99 Misc. 2d 383, 385, 416 N.Y.S.2d 187, 189 (N.Y. City Ct. 1979)
("Etihere are instances where due process limits the police power").
" In People u. H.W.S. Holding Corp., 12 ]Nfisc.2d 125, 175 N.Y.S.2d 391
(Nassau County Ct. 1958), the court stated that a criminal statute dealing with
apartment maintenance could not be enforced without proof of adenter becauze of
the potential harshness of the penalty (up to six months in jail). Because the
defendant had constructive knowledge of the illegal conditions, the court auggested,
but did not reach, the constitutional issue.
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tive: the legislature mandated long prison terms as both a
deterrent to and retribution for drug crime. Under strict liabili-
ty, a defendant's mistake of fact as to quantity may well sub-
ject him to life imprisonment. This indeed contravenes funda-
mental notions of fairness and proportionality to a shocking
degree.
Consequently, if a defendant lacks knowledge of the quan-
tity of narcotics possessed, then imposing a prison sentence
linked to that quantity is a violation of the defendant's due
process rights. The period of incarceration attributable to the
enhanced penalty is an unwarranted curtailment of the most
fundamental liberty interest-the liberty interest in personal
freedom. Incarceration is justified solely by society's compelling
interest in punishing and incapacitating persons who knowing-
ly commit bad acts. Society does not have a compelling or even
a rational interest in punishing a person for events and cir-
cumstances beyond his or her knowledge and control. It is a
gratuitous act to incarcerate a criminal for an additional five,
ten or twenty years because of a mistake of fact about the
quantity of narcotics he or she possessed. This violates stan-
dards of fairness and proportionality which the Constitution
guarantees.'66
CONCLUSION
People v. Ryan correctly affirms the importance of the legal
and moral principle that courts must not inflict punishment
without proof of mental culpability. It recognizes that the im-
portance of mens rea extends beyond a threshold determina-
tion of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Mens rea provides
equally important distinctions about the relative culpability of
persons who have committed a particular bad act. Such culpa-
bility distinctions are the most rational and just way for courts
to determine the severity of a defendant's punishment. The
alternative-strict liability-is properly limited to a discrete
category of social-welfare offenses, carrying minimal punish-
1. See Colozzo, 54 Misc.2d at 690, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 415 ("Due process of law
.... is a concept of what is fundamentally just, fair and right .... "); United
States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("fundamental
conceptions of fairness would dictate that a general culpability requirement be
deemed an essential aspect of due process").
[Vol. 61: 10111052
PEOPLE V. RYAN: A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
ment and social opprobrium. Because the narcotics offense in
Ryan was fundamentally different from a social-welfare of-
fense, the court's holding was proper and consistent with es-
tablished principles of criminal law.
Therefore, in responding to Ryan, the New York state
legislature erred in adopting a threshold mens rea regime for
narcotics crime. Threshold mens rea, as it is elucidated in the
federal courts, rests upon the flawed moral assumption that all
narcotics offenders are equally deserving of punishment. By
not allowing for a mistake of fact, it can subject unsophisticat-
ed, low-level narcotics offenders to punishment that is dramati-
cally disproportionate to their personal culpability. Moreover,
it provides minimal benefits to society as compensation for this
risk to individual injustice. Prosecutors are fully able to estab-
lish scienter for a truly culpable defendant through evidentiary
inferences and presumptions. Additionally, any deterrent im-
pact of threshold mens rea is limited to low-level drug crimi-
nals who pose the least menace to society. For its brief period
of effectiveness, the Ryan holding made New York State an
exemplar of the fundamental values of fairness and propor-
tionality in enforcing criminal statutes. The legislature should
have allowed these values to stand by not overriding the Court
of Appeals decision.
Alun Griffiths
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